

Methodological Appendix for “Disguised Collective Action in China”

This appendix is an extended discussion of methodological considerations that were not included in the body text of the paper, “Disguised Collective Action in China.” It first explains the research methods employed, the strengths and weaknesses of these methods, and the means of obtaining access to study underground labor organizations. It then discusses the recruitment of research subjects, the types and quantity of data collected, and potential sources of bias. It ends with a description of interview data and an archive of interviews conducted in the Pearl River Delta between 2009 and 2011.

Discovery and Access

When I began fieldwork in 2009 in China, I was interested in how migrant workers organized to claim their collective rights. I assumed that they lacked effective organizational vehicles since independent unions are banned in China. A fortuitous opportunity brought me face to face with some of the leaders of underground labor organizations. In 2009, I was invited to serve as an interpreter for a labor conference. Among the attendees of this conference were leaders of eight independent labor organizations in the Pearl River Delta. Through informal conversations with these leaders, I realized that I was witnessing a new political process unfolding: migrant workers organizing themselves through NGOs. These conversations led me to a new research question: How do organizations that are repressed by the state mobilize citizen contention?

The primary challenge of studying underground labor organizations in China was access. My fieldwork took place during the Hu-Wen administration (2003-2013), which placed a high

priority on maintaining social stability. The organizations I studied were by definition illegal; they either disguised themselves as commercial businesses or were completely unregistered. Thus, their leaders were wary of disclosing information about their organizational process to outsiders because of their precarious legal status. Even after establishing contact with the leaders, it was difficult to gain the trust of activists. State security agents periodically infiltrated the organizations or directly interrogated the leaders. As a result, activists were cautious about permitting individuals outside of a small network of trusted domestic scholars and students observe their activities. It was only after months of relationship-building with leaders and scholars embedded in the network of organizations that I was permitted to study these groups.

Political Ethnography

Political ethnography was the most advantageous method of studying the mobilization process of difficult-to-access organizations. It is useful for obtaining hidden data (Kapiszewski et al. 2015) and discovering new categories of phenomenon (Schatz 2009: 10-12). As a fundamentally interpretive exercise, it treats insider perspectives and meaning-making practices as valuable forms of data (Wedeen 2009, 2010). When I began fieldwork in 2009, public data on these organizations and their activities came largely from studies by Chinese and foreign scholars.¹ However, records of their presence and numbers were incomplete, as organizations either disappeared or relocated to different jurisdictions after being disbanded by state security. Since the universe of cases was unknown, ethnography provided a pathway to begin mapping the or-

¹ See He and Huang 2008; Huang 2007, 2008, 2012; Zhang and Smith 2009; Recent studies include Howell 2015, Franceschini 2014; Lee and Shen 2011; Spires 2011; and Froissart 2011.

ganizational landscape. Immersing myself in a network of organizations allowed me to identify other types of organizations that existed throughout the Pearl River Delta.

Ethnography also yielded a “thick description” (Geertz 1973) of the mobilization processes of these organizations that was inaccessible through ordinary interviews. Participant observation helps to address the challenges of interviewees either providing false information or omitting key events and details in formal interviews (Bleich and Pekkanen 2013: 88). Indeed, I found that labor activists had little incentive to reveal the hidden processes of mobilization during initial interviews. They delivered rehearsed “public transcripts” (Scott 1990) about their organizations that highlighted their efforts to promote legal education and to assist the local state in providing social services to migrant workers. Activists invoked stock phrases such as “rights advocacy” (*weiquan*), “citizenship consciousness” (*gonmin yishi*), and “raising legal awareness” (*tigao falu yishi*). These phrases suggested compliance with the state’s goals to maintain social stability and promote the rule of law.

Participant observation revealed a host of activities that interviewees did not initially describe—the informal practices of recruitment, tactical coaching and dissemination—that were crucial to the mobilizing process. I accompanied activists to hospitals where they would introduce themselves to injured workers whom they hoped to recruit. Within the organization, I observed labor activists coaching participants on both legal and illegal tactics of contention. This differed from activists’ “public transcripts,” which omitted any mention of extra-legal measures to defend worker rights. I also observed how participants responded to these tactics, the questions they asked, and the speech, gestures, and mannerisms they used to communicate with each other. In addition, participant observation took me outside of the organizations’ headquarters to

the sites of contention—including labor bureaus, courthouses, and factory floors—offices where workers deployed the atomized actions described in this study, to varying degrees of success. It provided opportunities to observe this process of tactical deployment, including interactions between state officials and workers.

Outside of the organizations, I also observed activists in eight formal conferences between 2009 and 2011 in Beijing and in the Pearl River Delta where they networked with activists, lawyers, and scholars from other regions of China. Through these conferences and other opportunities, I participated in informal conversations and meals in which I observed activists liaise with donors and, on occasions, government officials who were sympathetic to the organizations' work. I took note of the informal conversations and rumors that circulated among activists, including which organizations' leaders may have been recruited as informants by the state security apparatus. I also took note of the information they revealed or concealed from donors and the counsel that local scholars offered to them on strategies of survival. These participant observation activities allowed me to examine their "hidden transcripts" including "gesture, speech, practices—that are ordinarily excluded from the public transcript of subordinates by the exercise of power" (Scott 1990: 27). My presence at the organizations and in different informal settings shed light on how activists carried out their work as opposed to how they talked about their work.

This "experience near" approach (Geertz 1973) also generated information about how different actors experienced the mobilization and claims-making process as well as their perceptions of political life (Schatz 2009: 7). For example, activists described a shared perception of the central state as benevolent and the local state as a predatory and corrupt. In addition, some

activists saw their work as a step towards instigating political change (i.e. the democratization of China) while others harbored ambivalent attitudes towards political change and feared widespread social instability. During retreats or outings with worker participants, informal conversations revealed the views of some that civil society was in fact weak compared to the power of the state. Ethnography allowed me to probe these actors' interpretations of political reality, which informed their strategic behavior.

Researcher Positionality

Ethnography is by nature an interpretative enterprise that requires researchers to attend to how their engagement with people affects knowledge generation (Schatz 2009: 14-16). My findings should therefore be seen in light of my positionality vis-a-vis my research subjects. Throughout fieldwork, I introduced myself as a Ph.D. student from a foreign university. However, activists did not always confer upon me the same power and authority that they would to researchers who were older, male, or foreign. The organizational culture was male-dominated, and leadership roles were largely occupied by men in their 30s and 40s. The female staff usually held secretarial roles. Being perceived as the less authoritative than my male counterparts may have aided me in the participant observation process, as activists did not defer to me as an "expert." In addition, being ethnically Chinese and a native speaker of Mandarin meant that I did not attract undue attention from the organizations' clientele.

Nevertheless, my presence undoubtedly had some impact on their behavior. For example, when I accompanied workers to government offices to confront officials, I was a source of moral support. When I visited workers on recruitment trips, potential recruits saw me as a volun-

teer for the organization. When I participated in social activities—outings, retreats, and meals—workers saw me as a friend, but not as an equal in terms of social status. Depending on the degree to which they perceived me as a part of the organization, they may have concealed some of their criticisms of the organization’s advocacy strategies. In these ways, my immersion necessarily influenced the objectivity of the findings in exchange for a textured analysis of the mobilization process of underground labor organizations.

Case Selection and Characteristics

After my introduction to labor organization leaders at the conference described above, I selected 11 organizations out of the 45 identified in the Pearl River Delta for initial study. I identified six of these candidate organizations from the conference I had attended and the remaining five with the assistance of labor scholars and activists. I conducted on-site visits and interviews with the leaders and staff members of these organizations, as well as attended events legal workshops. I used the snowball technique of seeking additional organizations based on leads from these initial interviewees. This research helped to identify two distinct networks of underground labor organizations in the Pearl River Delta region: the Hong Kong network and the Mainland China network. I eventually gained access to two organizations (one from each network) for close ethnography for four months in the spring of 2010. I was able to access these organizations through introductions by labor scholars who supported their work and knew their leaders. Although the organizations that allowed me in were self-selected, they were typical of their respective networks, which I discuss in greater detail in the sampling bias section below.

Obtaining access to these organizations allowed me to conduct the participant observation activities described above.

As small, semi-legal organizations, these groups kept limited and incomplete records of their staff and activities, which fluctuated with their financial solvency. Reliable data on certain aspects of their work was therefore difficult to obtain. The groups I studied ranged from two to twelve staff members.² The founders and leaders, colloquially known as “the big brother” (*laoda*) typically made the major decisions about the organization’s trajectory while staff members were in charge of daily operations such as running legal workshops, legal consultation, discussion groups, and social activities. Larger organizations typically hired a staff lawyer who advised workers on navigating the formal labor dispute system and a female staff member who served as secretary. In addition to their formal staff, larger organizations also maintained a network of volunteers, who were typically former workers that became activists. They were referred to as “volunteers” rather than “members” to avoid politicization, since formal membership implied the workers belonged to an illegal union. These volunteers assisted the staff members in the organizations’ activities and provided moral support to fellow workers. The smallest organizations consisted of only the leader and one staff member.

Despite their limited staff, these organizations were able to reach a sizable number of workers because of the frequency of the events they organized. For example, during four months of observation inside one of the larger organizations in the Pearl River Delta, each branch of the organization conducted two legal workshops per month. Workshop attendance ranged from 40-

² A previous study of labor organizations in the PRD estimated an average of five staff members per organization (He And Huang 2008).

50 workers. In addition, each branch encountered approximately 15-20 workers in person and on the phone on a daily basis, seven days a week. Activists also made weekly recruitment trips to nearby hospitals to hand out pamphlets to injured workers.

Based on self-reporting by the organizations, the largest organization with twelve staff members provided over 30,000 individuals with legal consultation, directly assisted over 1,200 legal cases, and distributed over 200,000 organizational pamphlets to workers over a nine year period (2005-2013). A second organization with seven staff members provided over 6,000 workers with legal consultation, directly assisted 1,350 individuals with their legal cases, and distributed over 60,000 organizational pamphlets through hospital visits during a nine year period between 2006 and 2014.³ Because their activity level and type fluctuated depending on their financial solvency and the political climate, these data points may vary depending on the time period captured. Nonetheless, the combination of participant observation and self-reported data suggested that these organizations were able to reach a significant number of workers relative to their staff sizes.

Sampling Biases

Political ethnography seeks to study a problem from “the nearest possible vantage point” (Schatz 2009: 307) in order to uncover new phenomenon, to capture heterogeneity, and to provide an account of the lived experiences of human agents for the purposes of theory building (Scott 1985). Indeed, the goal of ethnography is not to generalize about a population but rather to construct novel theoretical concepts that may be applicable to other settings. Nevertheless, it

³ Since activists have incentives to inflate the number of clientele served, these figures should be interpreted as upper bounds.

is important to reflect on the degree to which the main finding of disguised collective action is unique only to the organizations that I studied, as opposed to a more widespread strategy among labor organizations across the Pearl River Delta.

Snowball sampling tends to over-select similar organizations or those embedded in a certain network while under-representing those outside of the network (Bleich and Pekkanen 2013: 87). It is also important to acknowledge the possible existence of other labor organizations, unknown and unconnected to the networks of subjects I interviewed and observed during my field research. This possibility of missing some organizations may be unavoidable given that these organizations often sought to operate under-the-radar.

However, there are reasons to believe that my findings are not isolated to the particular organizations in the sample. First, the sample of 11 labor organizations was typical of organizations the Pearl River Delta in three ways: they were illegal, funded by foreign organizations, and had previous experience of state harassment. Moreover, organizations belonging to the same network were relatively homogenous because many had been incubated from the same parent organizations. For example, in the mainland network, at least five founders of labor organizations had undergone informal training as volunteers at a parent organization, which served as a prototype for the mainland network. In the Hong Kong network, at least six organizations had formed under the direct influence of a parent organization (Huang 2012). As a result, these organizations provide similar services, including pro bono legal consultation for labor arbitration and litigation (in person and via hotline), legal representation, labor law workshops, hospital visits, social and cultural activities, and training workers to become volunteer activists. Organizations within the same network also communicated with each other. Their leaders often attended

the same labor conferences and were also networked with the same scholars. On several occasions, I personally observed scholars counsel the leaders in the same network on how to represent themselves as non-threatening to state officials. These similarities in their founding stories, service portfolio, and social networks suggest that the tactics in the organizations where I did not conduct participant observation likely resemble the tactics in those I did observe.

Based on participant observation and interviews with activists in these two clusters, disguised collective action was primarily deployed by organizations belonging to the Mainland network. Hong Kong network organizations used more radical mobilization techniques such as encouraging workers to engage in collective bargaining with employers or to stage small-scale collective demonstrations, which I observed in person on one occasion. The tendency towards more radical tactics aligned with the goals of Hong Kong leaders who came from a more politically liberal environment. In contrast, leaders in the mainland network harbored more conservative goals and were more risk-averse. Disguised collective action was the product of their experimentation with the limits of activism. The deliberate disguising of collective action behind atomized actions sought to reduce political risks. Unlike their Hong Kong network counterparts, mainland organizations did not seek to build collective action on a larger scale. Their aims were more modest; they sought to deliver compensation into the hands of workers while forging collective consciousness through the pedagogical process.

There is also the question of selection bias of worker-participants. Did contact with the organization drive workers' atomized actions, or did the workers who visited the organization constitute a self-selecting pool that was predisposed to using such tactics? While it is difficult to establish a statistical counterfactual in this setting, participant observation produced a contextual

understanding of the organization's impact on workers' rights-claiming behaviors. In certain cases, participant observation and interviews showed that strong-willed individuals may have deployed atomized action even without contact with an organization. However, most workers observed during fieldwork were deeply reluctant to deploy atomized actions without step-by-step coaching and moral support from activists throughout the rights-claiming process. By accompanying worker-participants to the site of contention, I observed the discrepancy between their stated ambitions to "stand up to the authorities" and their actual hesitation in the face of powerful officials and managers. Workers needed active coaching and moral support from activists to carry out their stated intentions because it was both risky and emotionally costly to threaten a state official or a factory boss. Equipped with knowledge of local bureaucracies, activist instructed workers on which state officials to target and how. Activists also contacted their network of journalists who amplify workers' claims and put pressure on officials and bosses to respond. In other words, in the cases I personally observed, workers received substantial instruction and encouragement from activists before deploying atomized actions.

Indeed, aggrieved citizens outside of organizations can and do, in fact, deploy atomized actions. For example, Chinese peasants protesting land grabs as well as "nail house residents"—individuals who refuse to move out of their houses in the face of coercive demolition—have resorted to threats and actual self-immolation as a form of protest (Langfitt 2013; McDonald 2012). While these atomized actions may be autonomously deployed by workers and other aggrieved individuals without organizational help, this is not central to the theoretical claims of this study: that labor organizations encouraged workers to take atomized actions to reduce organizational risk. This strategic element of disguised collective action distinguishes it from the idio-

syncratic behavior of individual contenders. Equally important is the effect of disguising collective action on organizational survival; disguised collective action is a mobilization strategy that facilitates organizational survival in a repressive environment.

Interviews

To place the participant observation data in its socio-political context, I also conducted formal and informal interviews as part of a larger study of labor organizations across China. To avoid being trapped in a single network of interlinked respondents, I interviewed 123 individuals that represented a diverse cross section of society with different relationships to labor organizations. These included 48 activists, 19 workers, 17 scholars, 8 donors, 6 employers, 3 journalists, and 3 lawyers. The remaining 19 interviews were conducted with government officials representing eight agencies and official organizations across six administrative levels.⁴ In the Pearl River Delta and Hong Kong, the focal sites of the research reported in this study, I conducted 63 semi-structured interviews with activists, workers, scholars, officials, lawyers, journalists, and enterprise representatives.⁵ I identified these interviewees through snowball sampling in which one interview subject became the source for identifying another interviewee (Bleich and Pekkannen 2013).

⁴ These agencies include the Bureau of Civil Affairs; the Bureau of Human Resources and Social Security (Labor); the All China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU); the All China Women's Federation (ACWF); the China Association for NGO Cooperation (CANGO); Xinhua News Agency; Social Organization Management Office; Government Development Research Center. The administrative levels include national, provincial, municipal/city, district, sub-district, and township.

⁵ Group interviews are counted as one interview.

I found that interviews conducted after having established a degree of trust with participants yielded much richer accounts of their experiences. Activists more readily shared their world-views—including interpretations that contradicted the organizations' leadership and sensitive information about their own encounters with state security—with a researcher who was immersed in their daily work. Likewise, worker participants were also more open to discussing their interpretation of the rights-claiming process with a researcher who had accompanied them to government offices or participated in the organizations' events. Therefore, , I conducted follow-up interviews with key activists after having established this trust. While initial interviews were open-ended, follow-up interviews were topically focused on organizational tactics and interactions with the state. The following interview archive lists the interviews conducted in the Pearl River Delta between 2009-2011.

Appendix: Interviews conducted in the Pearl River Delta⁶

Interviewee	Group	Mode	No.	Format	Length (formal)	Participant obser- vation context
1. Staff activist	A	In person	1	unstructured, formal	1h 30m	conferences, legal workshops, recruitment, social activities
2. Staff activist	A	In person	1	unstructured, formal	1h 45m	conferences, legal workshops, recruitment, social activities
3. Staff activist	A	In person	2	unstructured, formal and informal	1h 30m; 2h	conferences, daily intake, legal workshops, recruitment, social activities
4. Director, founder	A	In person	1	unstructured, informal	N/A	conferences, field visit to migrant community

⁶ This archive includes 63 interviews conducted in the Pearl River Delta, 2009-2011. No. denotes the number of interviews. The participant observation context column lists the settings outside of the interview location where I observed the activists. N/A under this category denotes no participant observation outside of the interview. N/A under length denotes interviews that were informal and therefore not timed. Concurrent notes are ones taken during the time of the interview by hand while transcripts are typed records. Group A: Labor organization activists and founders; Group B: Workers; Group C: Officials; Group D: Scholars; Group E: Enterprises, lawyers, and journalists.

Interviewee	Group	Mode	No.	Format	Length (formal)	Participant obser- vation context
5. Director, founder	A	In person	2	semi-structured, formal and informal	1h 30m	conferences, workshops, social activities, donor meeting
6. Former activist	A	In person	1	unstructured, informal	1h	N/A
7. Staff activist	A	In person	1	unstructured, informal	N/A	conferences, legal workshops, recruitment trips, social activities,
8. Staff activist, former participant	A	In person	1	unstructured, formal and informal	3h	demonstration event, field visit to Beijing labor NGO
9. Director, founder	A	In person	1	unstructured, informal	N/A	conferences, legal workshops
10. Director, founder	A	In person	1	unstructured, informal	1h	conferences
11. Director, founder	A	In person	1	semi-structured, formal	2h 15m	conferences
12. Assistant director	A	In person	1	semi-structured, formal	1h	N/A
13. Staff activist	A	In person	1	unstructured, informal	2h	on site visit
14. Staff activist	A	In person	1	unstructured, informal	N/A	on site visit

Interviewee	Group	Mode	No.	Format	Length (formal)	Participant obser- vation context
15. Director, founder	A	In person	4	unstructured; for- mal and informal	35m; 50m; 1h; 2h15m	conferences, onsite visit, workshops, donor meeting
16. Staff activist	A	In person	1	semi-structured, formal	1h 30m	conferences, legal workshops, social activities
17. Standing direc- tor	A	In person	1	semi-structured, formal	1h 30m	onsite visit
18. Scholar-activist	A	In person	1	unstructured, in- formal	N/A	discussion groups held at organization
19. Director	A	In person	2	semi-structured, formal and infor- mal	2 h; N/A	conversation at Beijing restaurant
20. Activist	A	In person	1	semi-structured, formal	2h	N/A
21. Worker partici- pant	B	In person	1	unstructured, in- formal	1h 30m	legal workshop; gov't offices, facto- ry, social activities
22. Worker partici- pant, volunteer	B	In person	1	unstructured, in- formal	1h	organization, social activities
23. Worker partici- pant, volunteer	B	In person	1	unstructured, in- formal	1h	organization, social activities
24. Worker partici- pant	B	In person	1	semi-structured, formal	1h	N/A

Interviewee	Group	Mode	No.	Format	Length (formal)	Participant obser- vation context
25. Worker participant, volunteer	B	In person	1	unstructured, informal	1h	N/A
26. Worker participant, volunteer	B	In person	1	unstructured, informal	1h 30m	discussion groups, demonstration event
27. Worker participant, volunteer	B	In person	1	unstructured, informal	1h 30m	discussion groups, demonstration event
28. Worker participant, volunteer	B	In person	1	semi-structured, informal	1h	organization, social activities
29. Worker	B	In person	1	unstructured, informal	1h 30m	N/A
30. Worker participant	B	In person	1	unstructured, formal	1h	N/A
31. Worker participant	B	In person	1	unstructured, formal	1h	N/A
32. Worker volunteers	B	In person	1	unstructured , formal	3h	N/A
33. Workers	B	In person	1	unstructured, informal	2h	discussion groups at organization
34. Workers	B	In person	1	unstructured informal	2h	discussion groups at organization
35. Workers	B	In person	1	unstructured, semi-structured	1h	N/A

Interviewee	Group	Mode	No.	Format	Length (formal)	Participant obser- vation context
36. Dept. of Civil Affairs Guang-dong	C	In person	1	semi-structured, formal	1h	conference
37. Guangdong Province Social Development Research Division	C	In person	1	unstructured, informal	2h	conferences
38. ACWF Federation Legal Aid Center (provincial level)	C	In person	1	semi-structured, formal	1h	conferences
39. ACFTU Law Department (city level)	C	In person	1	semi-structured, formal	1h	N/A
40. Bureau of Human Resources and Social Security (city level)	C	In person	1	semi-structured, formal	2h	N/A
41. Bureau of Human Resources and Social Security, (city level)	C	In person	1	semi-structured, formal	2h	N/A
42. Xinhua News Think Tank	C	In person	1	unstructured, informal	1h 30m	N/A

Interviewee	Group	Mode	No.	Format	Length (formal)	Participant obser- vation context
43. Bureau of Human Resources and Social Security (district level)	C	In person	1	semi-structured, formal	2h	N/A
44. Bureau of Human Resources and Social Security (sub-district level)	C	In person	1	semi-structured, formal	1h 30m	N/A
45. Bureau of Human Resources and Social Security	C	In person	1	semi-structured, formal	2h 50m	N/A
46. Mainland China scholar	D	In person	1	unstructured, informal	1h	conferences
47. Chinese scholar	D	In person	1	semi-structured, formal	1h 30m	conferences
48. Chinese scholar	D	In person	2	unstructured, informal	1h 30m; 2h	conferences
49. Mainland China scholar	D	In person	1	semi-structured, formal	1h 30m	N/A
50. Chinese scholar	D	In person	2	semi-structured; unstructured; formal and informal	30 m; 1h 30m	conferences, meetings w/donors, meetings w/officials
51. Hong Kong scholar	D	In person	1	unstructured, informal	1h	conferences

Interviewee	Group	Mode	No.	Format	Length (formal)	Participant obser- vation context
52. U.S. scholar	D	Phone	2	unstructured, formal	1h 30m	N/A
53. Member, board of director of labor organization	E	In person	1	unstructured, informal	2h	discussion group at organization
54. Member, board of directors of labor organization	E	In person	1	semi-structured; formal	2h	onsite interview
55. Vice president, enterprise	E	Phone	1	semi-structured; formal	1h 30m	N/A
56. Director of plant management, enterprise	E	In person	1	unstructured, informal	N/A	social event hosted by organization
57. Factory manager	E	In person	1	unstructured, informal	N/A	onsite factory visit
58. Factory vice president, CSR division	E	Phone	1	semi-structured, formal	1h 30m	social event hosted by organization
59. Staff lawyer, labor org.	E	In person	1	unstructured, informal and formal	N/A	demonstration event, litigation in court
60. Staff lawyer, labor org.	E	In person	1	semi-structured, unstructured; formal and informal	2h 0m	legal workshops, social events

Interviewee	Group	Mode	No.	Format	Length (formal)	Participant obser- vation context
61. Journalist	E	In person	1	unstructured, in-formal	2h 0m	N/A
62. Journalist	E	In person	1	semi-structured, formal	2h 0m	N/A
63. Lawyer	E	Phone	1	unstructured, for-mal	1h 30m	conferences

References

- Bleich, E., & Pekkanen, R. (2013). How to Report Interview Data. In L. Mosley (Ed.), Interview Research in Political Science (pp. 84-105). Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Geertz, C. (1973). The Interpretation of Cultures. New York: Basic Books.
- He, J., & Huang, H. (2008). Pearl River Delta's Migrant Labor Rights NGOs: A Descriptive Analysis. *Hong Kong Journal of Social Sciences*, 35, 41-71.
- Huang, Y. (2007). Quanqiuuhua beijingxiade Laogong Zijiu [Labor's Self Rescue in a Global Context]. *Nanfeng Chuang*, Nov, 62-64.
- Huang, Y. (2008). *Nongmingong fuquan yu kuaguo wangluo de zhichi: Zhusanjiaodiqu nongmingong zuzhi diaocha* [Empowerment of migrant workers and the support of trans-national networks: an investigation into migrant worker organizations in the Pearl River Delta]. *Diaoyan Shijie (The World of Survey and Research)*(5).
- Huang, Y. (2012). *Chuangzao Gongminquan: Laogong NGO de Hunhe Celue* [Constructing Citizenship Rights: Labor NGOs' Variable Strategies]. *Guojia Xinzheng Xueyuan Xuebao*, 4.
- Kapiszewski, D., MacLean, L.M., & Read, B.L. (2015). Field Research in Political Science: Practices and Principles. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Langfitt, F. (2013, Oct 23). Desperate Chinese Villagers Turn To Self-Immolation. NPR. Retrieved from <http://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2013/10/23/239270737/desperate-chinese-villagers-turn-to-self-immolation>.
- Lee, C. K. a. Y., Shen (2011). The Anti-Solidarity Machine: Labor NGOs in China. In S. Kuruvilla, C.K. Lee and Mary Gallagher (Eds), Iron Rice-Bowls to Informalization: Markets, State, and Workers in a Changing China (pp. 173-187). Ithaca: Cornell University.
- McDonald, M. (2012, Dec 1). Another 'Nail House' in China Gets Hammered. The New York Times. Retrieved from <http://rendezvous.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/12/01/another-nail-house-in-china-gets-hammered/>.
- Schatz, E. (Ed.) (2009). Political Ethnography: What Immersion Contributes to the Study of Power. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

- Scott, J. (1985). Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Scott, J. (1990). Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Spires, A. (2011). Contingent Symbiosis and Civil Society in an Authoritarian State. *Journal of Sociology*, 117(1).
- Wedgeen, Lisa. 2009. "Ethnography as Interpretive Enterprise." In *Political Ethnography: What Immersion Contributes to the Study of Power*, ed. Edward Schatz. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 75–94.
- Wedgeen, Lisa. 2010. "Reflections on Ethnographic Work in Political Science." *Annual Review of Political Science*, 13 (1): 255–72.
- Zhang, H. & Smith, M. (2009). Navigating a Space for Labor Activism: Labor NGOs in the Pearl River Delta of South China. In J. a. S. S. Schwartz (Ed.), *State and Society Responses to Social Welfare Needs in China: Serving the People* (pp. 224): Routledge.