

# Power and Institutionalization

## Draft Report of QTD Working Group I.3

May 2019

### Working Group Members\*

Rachel Riedl, Northwestern University

Ekrem Karakoc, State University of New York, Binghamton

Tim Büthe, *Hochschule für Politik*/Technical University of Munich and Duke University

---

\* Rachel Beatty Riedl <[r-riedl@northwestern.edu](mailto:r-riedl@northwestern.edu)> is Associate Professor of Political Science, Director of the Program of African Studies, and a Faculty Fellow of the of the Institute for Policy Research at Northwestern University. Ekrem Karakoc <[ekarakoc@binghamton.edu](mailto:ekarakoc@binghamton.edu)> is Associate Professor of Political Science at Binghamton University (SUNY). Tim Büthe <[buthe@hfp.tum.de](mailto:buthe@hfp.tum.de)> is Professor of Political Science and Public Policy and Chair for International Relations at the Hochschule für Politik/TUM School of Governance and the TUM School of Management at the Technical University of Munich (TUM), as well as a Senior Fellow of the Kenan Institute for Ethics at Duke University.

The work of the QTD working groups was supported in part by the U.S. National Science Foundation's Political Science Program under Grant No. 1644757. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this report are those of the authors and/or participations in the QTD deliberative process and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Science Foundation.

For comments on previous drafts of this report, we thank Zlatina Georgieva and Tobias Rommel.

## Introduction

Working group I.3 was established to consider the advantages and disadvantages of different ways of fostering research explicitness.<sup>1</sup> We sought to foster discussion of questions such as: What are the goals of institutionalizing research explicitness? For what kinds of challenges are different models of institutionalization (including voluntary social norms, explicit standards, and mandatory rules) best suited? How do the costs and benefits of these different institutional forms differ? And in particular: How do different institutional modes for advancing research explicitness interact with power and resource differentials between scholars at different career stages, undertaking different kinds of work, or located at different kinds of educational institutions? Who should make judgments about trading off openness or explicitness against other intellectual, social, or ethical goals? Working group I.3 was also called upon to consider the appropriate role of particular institutional actors—editors and reviewers, IRBs, funding agencies—in enforcing/promoting research explicitness.

This report addresses these questions by describing different possible models of institutionalization surrounding research explicitness. It also applies these models to different elements of the research production process, from planning and production transparency to analytic transparency, to data sharing. We then consider ways of approaching research explicitness from differing perspectives embedded within power and resource hierarchies.

## Differing Models of Institutionalization

Norms governing how scholars gather information, how they analyze that information, *how they communicate about these important elements of the research process* vis-à-vis various scholarly and non-scholarly audiences, and whether or how much of one's records or "raw data" to share with others, can be institutionalized in a variety of ways. Scholarly norms can emerge, for instance, through regularized social inactions,<sup>2</sup> through deliberative, possibly even conflictual processes,<sup>3</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup> Contributors to the QTD deliberations (especially the fora of working groups I.1 (Ontological and Epistemological Priors) and III.2 (Interpretive Methods) and to discussions elsewhere have pointed out that the very word "transparency" has problematic associations for many non-positivist scholars of politics, as noted in the overview essay by Jacobs, Büthe, et al. (2019). Some working groups have therefore decided to avoid the term transparency in their reports. Other reports, following a compromise proposal by the steering committee, use "openness" and/or "explicitness" in lieu of or alongside "transparency" without drawing a distinction. Others differentiate research transparency explicitly from related terms such as research openness, research explicitness, or research integrity. For purposes of this report we have decided to use "research explicitness" even when discussing what on various QTD threads and in a large number of bilateral and small group offline exchanges was often discussed as "research transparency." We do so partly in recognition in an attempt to pay deference to arguments by interpretivists and others that the very specific words we choose often have political consequences, but also in light of the case Craig Parsons made during the early days ("Stage 1") of the deliberations for replacing "research transparency" with "research explicitness" because explicitness is "definitional of scholarship" and makes it less likely to be mistaken for endorsing a simplistic notion of "truth," which we have found to be compelling (Thread "'Truth' or DARE", starting with Parson's post of 11 April 2016, 7:43pm, <https://www.qualtd.net/viewtopic.php?f=10&t=83>). A focus on research "explicitness" might have the added advantage of facilitating engagement with related debates in neighboring disciplines (see, e.g., Snel 2019). That said, we retain the terms "production transparency" and "analytical transparency" for consistency with other QTD reports.

<sup>2</sup> See, e.g., Ostrom; Axelrod; Sikink

<sup>3</sup> Habermas; Risse

or through more or less inclusive, explicit standard-setting or rule-making processes.<sup>4</sup> Such processes may take place within informal, possibly highly specialized scholarly communities, in professional associations, or at various other local, national, or international levels. Moreover, processes of developing or articulating norms, standards, or rules can be inclusive, participatory, bottom-up or tightly controlled top-down. Given the central importance of scholarly publications (and, at least for some research, intra- and extramural funding) journal editors, publishers, and funding agencies are often seen as playing a central role in the institutionalization of research explicitness. But even the leading journals, publishers, and funding agencies within our discipline differ greatly in what they require of scholars, particularly when their research involves diverse methods of gathering information, various "qualitative" analytical techniques, and research records beyond datasets.

To help clarify the dimensions on which the institutionalization of norms for the explication of one's research methods differ, we begin by sketching four starkly different ideal-typical scenarios. We then discuss for each scenario the implications for power and other inequities among scholars of politics.

### *1. "Let 100 Flowers Bloom":*

#### *Strictly Voluntary Individual Practices Without Institutionalization*

One possible approach is to consider it a strictly discretionary, individual decision by each scholar what information to disclose about (and from) her or his research. Here, some widely shared understandings of good practices might exist, but in the absence of *universally* shared understandings do not warranted even being considered social norms.<sup>5</sup> Consequently, it should be left entirely to the individual scholar to decide whether to implement any particular practices in her or his own research and what to communicate about the research process. Institutionalization, and certainly the creation of incentives or enforcement of compliance, is under this approach considered normatively undesirable, as well as arguably impractical.

Implications for Power and Inequity: This radical libertarian approach is appealing in that it maximizes scholarly freedom. It also might be expected to be conducive to Kuhnian scientific revolutions. On the face of it, it seems to provide a strong safeguard against the exercise of power and thus to maximize equality. The absence of formal power structures, however, may be a highly imperfect safeguard against the exercise of power or inequities. Research funding and pages in prestigious journals, for instance, are bound to still be scarce; and the seniority of the author, the status of his/her university, the size of a scholar's network and debts colleagues owe to her or him (which are bound to be at least partly a function of resource inequities) all might be expected to play a larger role in funding and publication decisions if reviewers, editors, and program directors were called upon not to use (appropriately differentiated) methodological criteria in the assessment of research projects and manuscripts. Complete discretion with regard to the information a scholar is expected to share about her or his research process, which a scholar is expected to disclose, also would impede assessment and learning by one's colleagues. And the lack of requirements to disclose the sources of the scholar's funding, her or his positionality vis-à-vis research subjects, and other possible conflicts of interest, would seem to obfuscate consequential inequities rather than provide a safeguard against them.

---

<sup>4</sup> See, e.g., Büthe and Mattli 2011.

<sup>5</sup> And if universally shared understandings exceptionally existed, they would require neither codification nor enforcement as of best practices, making them politically unproblematic.

While this approach is conceivable, we actually see little support for going this far—possibly for the above reasons—though some scholars, including contributors to various QTD discussion boards, have expressed positions seemingly endorsing such a radical libertarian approach.<sup>6</sup>

## 2. Social Norms with Individual Responsibility for Implementation

In a second ideal-typical scenario, understandings regarding scholarly explicitness about the research process are social norms, specific to and potentially quite different across scholarly (sub-)communities. Social norms, understood as "expectations about appropriate behavior" that are "collective"<sup>7</sup> in the sense of being widely "shared among a community of actors,"<sup>8</sup> play an important role in politics and governance from the most local level (within families, in groups of friends, among colleagues in a particular firm or workplace) to the international or global level.<sup>9</sup> What does a social norms approach to research explicitness imply?

Saying that social norms need to be widely shared within a community of actors does not imply complete harmony on all aspects of research explicitness within the community (nor, of course, vis-à-vis other communities). Engaging in explicit, open debate over community expectations – i.e., over what exactly the norms are and require – clarifies not only what is widely agreed but also what the limits of that agreement are (both the substantive limits and possibly the geographic-physical or social network limits of the sub-communities who might even be constituted by sharing and articulating a common understanding of "appropriate" research practices while differing in their understanding from other sub-communities).<sup>10</sup> In fact, deliberations such as the QTD – i.e., public debates in advance, inclusive of, or at least open to, all who will be affected by the decision(s) that might follow the deliberations, involving "argumentative exchanges" and "reciprocal reason giving"<sup>11</sup> – are arguably valuable in large part because they facilitate *identifying the differences* that cannot be bridged through compromise (as well as enabling the articulation of common understandings and thus the formation of social norms).<sup>12</sup>

Moreover, the development of widely shared understandings – social norms – regarding research explicitness does not imply that the norms are never violated, not even within a particular community. To be sure, widespread violations raise questions about whether an understanding is really shared by the members of the community and thus undermine the norm.<sup>13</sup> But occasional violations of social and the resulting opportunities to observe community reactions to such violations can help clarify what the locally effective social norms are.<sup>14</sup> Observing, for instance, that a person who crosses the street at a crosswalk during the red light gets chided or clearly frowned upon, even when there are no cars approaching from any direction, strongly suggest that there is a strong social norm against such jay-walking. Observing that the chiding and frowning

---

<sup>6</sup> ... [Reference here specific QTD posts]

<sup>7</sup> Katzenstein, Jepperson and Wendt 1996: 54.

<sup>8</sup> Finnemore 1996: 22.

<sup>9</sup> See also: March & Olson 1989; Keohane 2009; ...

<sup>10</sup> See, e.g., Risse 2000.

<sup>11</sup> Elstub (2019:193) based on Floridaia (2014:305). See also Dryzek *et al* 2019; Mutz 2006; Warren 1996.

<sup>12</sup> REFs

<sup>13</sup> REFs

<sup>14</sup> REFs

only occurs when children are present at the crosswalk is highly informative about the scope conditions for which the social norm is supposed to govern appropriate behavior; conversely, seeing New York parents with small children often be the first to cross the street at the red light suggests that the norm is not widely shared in that particular community. In sum, widespread compliance with a social norm, as well as occasional violations and the community reaction to them, help affirm and "reconstitute" the social norm through practice within communities that may in part be defined or circumscribed by those shared understandings or expectations.

Notwithstanding such shared understandings, the implementation of social norms is first and foremost an individual responsibility, albeit – as *social* norms, rather than as strictly voluntary individual practices – completed and reinforced by enforcement as a community task. In the social norms scenario, such enforcement is carried out, above all, through the decentralized assessment of the completed research by a scholar's peers – though possibly in addition and in extreme cases through refusals to fund or (recommendations of) decisions not to publish.

The social norms ideal type approximates the long-standing practice at most journals, publishing houses, and funding agencies until recently – and for most forms of non-algorithmic research approximates the practices at journals such as *World Politics* and *Comparative Political Studies* to this day. To the extent that reviewers raise concerns about certain aspects of the research process (or the lack of information about specific steps or practices in the research practice), particularly if two or more reviewers note concerns consistently, the editors are much more likely to ask the author(s) to elaborate or more fully explain, and they are more likely to reject a manuscript if the underlying research appears to violate the pertinent research community's social norms regarding research practice or the author fails to comply with the community's research explicitness norms.

Implications: Governance through social norms involves a diffuse exercise of power (by definition, no single actor can change social norms unilaterally), yet this long-established practice nonetheless situates the individual scholars in potentially very strong power relationships, balanced only by the ease of leaving a given scholarly community.<sup>15</sup> At the same time, since social norms are not fully explicitly (as social norms, they are not codified), it may be quite hard for new entrants to join a research community. Also: editors (and program officers at funding agencies) exercise substantial power in selecting, through their choice of reviewers, the research community or communities whose norms should govern.

### 3. Standards

#### *with Various Incentives for Adoption and/or Possible, Decentralized Enforcement*

In the third scenario, understandings regarding scholarly explicitness about the research process are institutionalized as standards, i.e., explicit norms that are codified through some kind of standards-development process and recognized (at least by some in a given research community) as guidance for practice. Occasionally, an individual socio-political actor single-handedly

---

<sup>15</sup> REFs

develops a "standard,"<sup>16</sup> but usually, developing a standard is a social process involving multiple, possibly many stakeholders in a public or private forum.<sup>17</sup>

In principle, anyone – including any subset of any scholarly community – can explicitly articulate any number of prescriptive principles for scholarly practice without necessarily affecting anyone outside the participating group itself. Erik Bleich's and Robert Pekkanen's proposal that research publications based interviews be accompanied by an Interview Methods Table, for instance, may be considered such an explicit articulation of a scholarly norm,<sup>18</sup> which has little or no effect on (discussions of) research practices outside the community of scholars conducting interview research. And even within that community, the proposal as such obliged no one and left anyone else free to articulate alternative proposals, including a norm *not* to provide such tables. As a matter of politics and governance, the key questions are: What allows some explicit norms to become standards in the sense of becoming recognized and effective as prescriptive guidance for practice? And if so, who had or has – *de jure* and *de facto* – a chance to participate in setting and/or selecting the standard?

In many realms of contemporary life, there are multiple, at least partly competing standards. When the (often commercial) stakes are high, this can lead to fierce contests – in the technological and commercial realm also known as "standards wars" – in which market- and nonmarket-tactics may be brought to bear to achieve dominance.<sup>19</sup> In the governance of various professional practices, by contrast, multiple different and even incompatible standards can co-exist for a long time, each guiding the behavior of subsets of the "targets"<sup>20</sup> whose behavior the competing standards seek to govern, as illustrated by the multitude of standards for organic agricultural goods or corporate social responsibility standards.<sup>21</sup> To the extent that we similarly developed multiple standards of research explicitness among which scholars could at least initially freely choose, the process of selection, through which some standards might ultimately become dominant, would also need to be considered in assessing the implications of an institutionalization of research explicitness norms as standards.

Moreover, for some standards, there is, at least *de facto*, a pre-determined institutional focal point for developing the standard, such as maybe a section of a professional association, if a scholarly community generally considers the association's section appropriate and without alternative as the governance institution for research practices. Such a "unitary" institutional structure for selecting a particular prescriptive proposal as "the" standard (which may also consist of several hierarchically related institutions for jointly making decisions), raises the questions regarding who has or exercises power in the standard-setting process even more forcefully.

Considering these aspects is particularly important because governance through standards involves – under all but the most exceptional of circumstances – the exercise of power, even if

---

<sup>16</sup> To provide a QMMR example: In the early years of qualitative comparative analysis (QCA), sociologist Charles Ragin, who essentially came up with the idea of using set theory in this way as a technique for social and political analysis – and who for several years was its predominant promoter, who explained the technique and its underlying logic to a generation of doctoral students, before others started to join him in further developing this analytical toolset – might be said to have single-handedly set the initial standards for which results of a QCA to report and how.

<sup>17</sup> See Büthe and Mattli 2011, esp. chapter 2.

<sup>18</sup> Bleich and Pekkanen 2013; 2016.

<sup>19</sup> See, e.g., Augerau et al 2006; Brookey 2007; Crane 1979; Dranove and Gandall 2003; McNicholl 2006; Shapiro and Harian 1999.

<sup>20</sup> Büthe 2012.

<sup>21</sup> REFs.

such exercise of power may not becoming apparent and is virtually never overtly coercive. As standards, prescriptive statements are by definition not mandatory, that is, implementation and compliance are – at least *de jure* – voluntary. Their explicitness, however, facilitates a decision by others – in their respective jurisdictions – to require the implementation or compliance with a particular standard. In the United States, regulators and legislators have for many years relied on the "technical" standards developed by various non-governmental expert bodies, including professional associations, to govern various "technical" aspects of public life from building codes to radiological safety – to human subject protection in research.<sup>22</sup> In more recent years, the OECD has more generally advocated this approach to regulatory governance to allow governments to benefit from private expertise and deal with the often fast pace of technological change.

Research on the political aspects and consequences of standards shows, moreover, that even when a standard is not subsequently rendered mandatory through regulatory or legislative measures, targeted users may feel that they have *de facto* little choice but to implement and comply with the standard. Some of the reasons for such *de facto* obligations, observed among commercial actors with regard to technical standards, rarely if ever apply to scholarly work.<sup>23</sup> Yet, whenever a standard succeeds in being widely perceived as specifying "best practice," it shifts the burden of proof (or at least the burden of "reason-giving") from reviewers or editors who might demand certain things from an author to scholars and authors who might wish to behave in ways that are not consistent with those postulates. And as Büthe (2012) shows, whenever the "targets" of a standard – those whose behavior is intended to be governed by the prescriptions contained in the standard – are not fully included among those who "supply" such governance by setting the standard (and the more the decisionmaking procedure for adoption of the standard diverges from unanimity) the more does governance through standards inherently involve the exercise of power.

In comparison with strictly voluntaristic individual practices or social norms, the institutionalization of research explicitness as a set of (suitably differentiated) standards has advantages but also downsides. The more explicit articulation of such norms is surely pedagogically valuable in that it helps scholars who are new to a given research community (as graduate student or as more advanced scholars seeking to expand their analytical toolkit or learning how to conduct a different kind of research) figure out what the members of that community consider best practice. Standardization thus also lowers the barriers to entry – an important counterweight against an abuse of concentrations of power. At the same time, codification is likely to constrain and discourage innovative yet unconventional practices, all the more when traditionalists attain gatekeeping functions, e.g. as editors or funding agency program officers.

Finally, note a related, important implication of institutionalizing research explicitness norms as standards: One of the widely recognized benefits of codifying such norms in standards-developing processes is the increased clarity and predictability of expectations – an especially important issue if others are to rely upon the resulting findings or methods. Accordingly, well-regarded standards developing organizations often have a general or standard-specific period of

---

<sup>22</sup> See, e.g., Hamilton 1978. In the United States, universities and research institutes that receive research funds from the federal government are required to have an "Institutional Review Board" (essentially a university-internal committee of non-governmental experts) to conduct an advance review of all research involving "human subjects" to ensure that it does not violate ethical principles – as discussed in greater details in the reports of QTD Working Groups I.2 and II.1.

<sup>23</sup> As political scientists, we generally do not have to worry about courts holding us liable for malfunctioning products simply because we failed to follow "best practices" in production or liability insurance companies therefore demanding higher premia (see Büthe 2010).

assured stability, during which a standard, once it has been adopted, may not be changed. At the same time, standards developing bodies that are focused on their long-term institutional viability and relevance want to avoid ossification. Leading SDOs therefore provide regular opportunity for review whether an existing standard meets all users' needs and/or may need to be revised in light of new technological or other developments. This suggests that the institutionalization of research explicitness norms as standards might need to be accompanied by mechanisms for review and revision of any such standards at regular intervals.

#### 4. Rules:

##### *Obligatory Prescriptions with Centralized Enforcement*

Rules differ from standards, above all, by being de jure mandatory, at least for a specified target group. When journal editors set a word limit for submissions to the journal, they are not just setting a standard but a rule – though journals differ in the extent to which (and the stage at which) they enforce the limit, as some journals, for instance, refuse to review manuscripts that, at the time of the initial submission, exceed the limit (but might raise the limit substantially afterwards), whereas others are willing to review substantially longer manuscripts but will require authors of accepted manuscripts to keep to the limit for the main article before final submission (often while allowing substantial appendices and supplemental materials). Journal A's rules for length, formatting, bibliographic style, etc., as such only applies to submissions to that journal, but may also become a de facto standard for others, for instance by creating incentives for authors to follow the standard long before a decision on where to submit the manuscript, so as to make it easier to possibly submit to journal A, as well as incentives for other journals to adopt the same (or at least compatible) rules if they want manuscripts written for submission to journal A to be also submittable to them with maximum ease. The literature on regulatory competition<sup>24</sup> suggests that such considerations could lead to a race to the bottom, but given the characteristics of scholarly publishing and the incentives for being recognized as having the "highest standards," the leading journals in a given discipline or subfield probably have the capacity to initiate races "to the top" following the logic of David Vogel's "California effect" for environmental regulation in the United States.<sup>25</sup> Alternatively, the competition among journals may lead to greater "sideways" differentiation, including in the applicable rules.

A number of journals have gone beyond adopting rules for length, formatting, etc. and adopted rules for research explicitness as well. Indeed, the DA-RT proponents' efforts to commit political science journal editors to the DA-RT principles via the Journal Editors' Transparency Statement ("JETS") is an effort to turn standards into rules and very probably has prompted so much pushback for exactly this reason. Many "JETS" journals, however, have adopted such rules for quantitative and algorithmic analyses, only. Current practices of the *American Journal of Political Science* comes closest to taking a full-fledged rules approach and imposing those rules on qualitative research, too (though not necessarily to the qualitative components of seemingly quantitative research).

In sum, all the considerations noted for standards apply, often a fortiori, when prescriptions for research explicitness get institutionalized as rules. And especially where there is little or no meaningful competition, rules entail an overt and arguably more pervasive exercise of power than

---

<sup>24</sup> See, e.g., Barrows 2009; Cary 1974; de Sombre 2005; Drezner 2000; Murphy 2004; Revesz 1992; Schneiberg and Bartley 2008.

<sup>25</sup> Vogel 1995.

the alternatives. Standards and especially rules might be more helpful for achieving replicability of the reported empirical findings (whenever replicability is meaningful for the research at hand) but at the same time make scientific "revolutions" successively less (and "normal science" successively more) likely.

## **II. Types of Research Explicitness:**

### **Data Production Process Transparency, Analytic Transparency, and Post-Analysis Data Availability**

Hierarchies of power and degrees of institutionalization have consequences for different types of research explicitness. Varied forms of qualitative research methodologies have different procedures as well as distinct and unequal challenges to explicitness about all stages of the research chain. Providing a sub-set of post-analysis data for replicability poses unequal challenges to different types of researchers, but this is only the tip of the iceberg of full research explicitness. Full explicitness might also include transparency about the process of research design, data gathering (including what was observed and what was not; what was allowed to be made public and what was not), and the analytic process of meaning making. Even at the high end of the Institutionalized Model spectrum of "Rules: Obligatory Prescriptions with Centralized Enforcement," it is uncommon for all three types of transparency to be specified. Combined with the resource inequalities described in section III below, the burden of full research explicitness across all types is extremely high and serves to limit scholars at all stages of scholarly production. The discussion of these disaggregated types can productively further shape social norms and even standards *within* subgroups of scholarly communities and methodological approaches.

Making certain types of "post-processing," "post-analysis" or "cleaned" data available is one dimension of Post-Analysis Data transparency. This could include some sub-set of the full data collection effort of a larger project for one publication. For example, a scholar may have conducted hundreds of interviews and one publication could draw heavily from a very select few given the topic and the scholar's own analytic processing of the material. These few interviews could then be anonymized, made legible/transcribed/translated and generally be made available for public dissemination. As discussed in section III, making this type of post-analysis data available has real costs to scholars in terms of time, resources, data-ownership, and other considerations of inequality. But it is also only one element of data transparency. Without consideration of full research explicitness, the post-analysis data transparency may obfuscate important elements of the data production, collection, and analytic process.

Another level of data transparency includes questions about the generation and production process, which includes all of the primary steps of a researcher's decision making about what types of data to collect, where, how, and through what lens it will be analyzed. Given different models of institutionalization and norms of transparency, there are often unclear and unequal expectations surrounding whether scholars should make clear and transparent the process of data production, in addition to the actual data collected and used in the publication.

Data production process transparency for some types of scholars and some types of journals might include providing a description on the process of data gathering, including steps from a pre-analysis plan to actual implementation of a data-gathering process, the number of interviews among which type of informants, subjects, and experts, survey sample descriptions, the process by which survey samples were designed, and so forth. The description of the data production process

is related to the researcher's guiding theory, given the set of parameters that shape the researcher in setting the overall research design: sample size, locations, relevant populations, etc. Some see this information as necessary to be able to assess the testing technique, the scope of the explanation, explanatory depth, explanatory breadth, theoretical unification, internal validity, and external validity.

While we might see advantages to including this data "production process" description, it may also impose real costs and constraints across different types of scholars and categories of scholarship. We can predict that this type of reporting is certainly most problematic in cases where human subjects' anonymity and well-being are of concern (in authoritarian regimes, contexts of violence, marginalized populations, etc.), as noted in working groups 1.2 (Ethics) and 2.1 (Research with Human Participants). In some cases, full production transparency will make it too obvious which populations were informants, which populations were surveyed with minority positions or demographics, etc. This is of greatest concern to researchers working in sensitive or insecure contexts, and doubly problematic when the number of observations is smaller, as might be the case in qualitative research, given that it makes each data point potentially more identifiable (where unique).

These issues create unequal priorities, risks, and costs between researchers and editors or reviewers, given that the editors and reviewers may require such information to fully assess the analytical transparency process, but researchers bear full responsibility of the protection of their subjects and have better contextual knowledge of how to best protect in the particular circumstances of each case.

These issues also create unequal burdens for different types of methodologies and data generation processes. In some data gathering, the sampling frame may be pre-determined, for example, whereas in others it may not. In some data gathering, the type of observations sought for analysis may be tightly proscribed, whereas in others the valid forms of observations may be fluid and open to interpretation throughout the data gathering process. In sum, the constraints to doing certain types of data production and in certain contexts would be much higher depending on the level of institutionalization and expectations surrounding the *types* of transparency under consideration. The ideal types listed above may be more or less feasible, beneficial, or constraining for particular types of research if we are only discussing post-analysis data transparency, compared to the costs and opportunities of including production process data transparency as well.

Strict adherence to production transparency may have advantages for describing data collection that was not used, where data collection and analysis produced null results, and where it was conflicting to the original theory but helped shape new hypotheses later tested, for example. Including full production transparency can help accumulate knowledge and can help other scholars learn about what data has been collected and where different types of data exist. The benefits from full production transparency may accrue in particular to junior scholars or those with less research funding to identify existing data. But there is also a high potential cost to scholars and journals in time and publication length to exhaustively describe all they have done.

There is also a question regarding best practices in assessing production transparency for editors, reviewers, authors, and funders. At what stages is production transparency assessed? In the grant application and project proposal stage? By the researcher throughout the stages of the project? By the editors and reviewers in publication stage? These costs of assessing production transparency would also vary by power and resource hierarchies in funding agencies, internal

institutional capacities to assess research pre-analysis plan, and in journals' editor and reviewer resources and expenses.

Finally, analytic transparency poses a distinct set of challenges for qualitative researchers. Analytic transparency calls for radical honesty about how political scientists infer conclusions from their data. Two issues are of particular concern. First, "honesty about one's research practices often means discarding the linguistic template of deductive proceduralism that structures most writing" and publication norms make it difficult to include the "messier, iterative, and open-ended nature of political science scholarship."<sup>26</sup> While quantitative scholars may log keystrokes for statistical programs, qualitative scholars may increase real-time recording of research activities as a logged register, address positionality in stating what work has been done and how, and journals can provide authors with protected space to reveal research practices, which could contribute pedagogically to methods training in this domain. Second, contextual accuracy is needed by both the scholar and the reviewer/replicator to interpret the data. Even when several interviews and sources coincide to triangulate the data itself, interpretation is still key to (mis)represent reality.<sup>27</sup> In addition to understanding the research context, there is also a particular interpersonal interaction between the researcher and participant which can be specifically relational and deeply intersubjective in which "no data is truly raw or unfiltered."<sup>28</sup> Therefore, researchers and readers alike must be attentive to analytic transparency while endeavoring to clearly define positionality and the process of knowing.

### **III. Types of Journals, Researchers, and Universities: How Differences Interact with Power and Institutions**

The ideal types raised above have differential consequences and provide unequal incentives and constraints for scholars across a variety of categories and types of scholars. These categories include: rank (from graduate student, temporary employment/visiting and adjunct professorships, to assistant, associate and full professors), type of institution (including Liberal Arts Colleges, Public, Private, and Research 1 to tech or community colleges), methodological approach (including qualitative and quantitative but importantly also including more distinct modes of analysis including constructivist interpretation, ethnography, formal modeling, experiments, surveys, interviews, new data collection and coding, big data, text analysis, etc), epistemological traditions, gender categories and under-represented minority scholars (considering barriers to networks, resources, and expression of social norms among different communities that may vary), geographic locations ("domestic" scholars and internationally-based scholars), sources or types and temporality of funding research (external grants, University funds, short-term/uncertain versus long-term/sustained), and context of research environment (security concerns for researcher and/or research subjects).

It is impossible to discuss, in fairness, differences across subdisciplines, methodological approaches, geographical locations and sources of funding research and others in this short report. Thus, a general discussion and emphasizing differences in some of them here aims to convey some challenges and perspectives journals, editors, researchers and reviewers face. Institution settings and resources across higher education, not only in the US but also across the world, provide an

---

<sup>26</sup> Yom 2018

<sup>27</sup> QTD Post Vicky Murillo Thread Power and the Institutionalization of Research Transparency/Openness/Explicitness and Aili Tripp II.C <http://tinyurl.com/gwt0x3v>

<sup>28</sup> QTD Post Robin Turner and Tim Pachirat I.1 <http://tinyurl.com/j9wp6a2>

unequal social, political and financial context where scholars engage in producing academic works. We know that research or teaching universities have different priorities, which endow academicians with resources in disparity. Extramural research funds exist, but they are not independent of scholars who may work in academic settings with differential resources. Some disciplines may rely on internal or extramural resources more than others, which then pose a disparity in resources in producing and disseminating data.

### *Journals and their Differentiated Types*

Journals in their subfield may develop a guideline that does not replicate one another but reflecting their epistemological and methodological approaches. For instance, the American Journal of Political Science's DA-RT guideline will differ from Middle Eastern Studies' or Journal of North African Studies' or International Security's. That's why it may serve the best for all that specific sub-fields may have a different approach, devoted to specific types of scholarship and that is consistent with the logic, differentiated approaches by research communities.

As discussed in various forums of DA-RT, other differences in journal exist also. Journals may have unequal resources for the data repository. Who will check whether materials for dissemination and how decisions will be made? The journals may need new resources/staff to review research materials and enforce on authors. Enforcement will create tensions between the journals and authors; people have to internalize it, but developing social norms most scholars internalize will surely take time.

Editors as Trustees: Editors have a responsibility and therefore certain empowerment to ensure certain characteristics of work they deem appropriate. As you move from norms to rules you exercise power at a much greater extent.

Editors have to exercise power by considering differences in approaches in doing via research as well as sharing/dissemination data. Editors should be mindful of differences across disciplines, methodological approaches, and other factors. The institutionalization of how to disseminate research may consolidate rules and regulations, but one hazard is that as times passes by, new rules and regulations may be needed, which may create difficulty in producing and dissemination research. Editors, as trustees, will avoid creating uniform regulations that do not take into account vast differences in disciplines, methods, locations. Journal editorial teams may create a division of labor in which those specialized in particular research methodologies can assume responsibilities to enforce homogenous rules over what and how to deposit the data.

### *Researchers/scholars/authors – as differentiated types*

Qualitative or quantitative research methodologies have different procedures as well as difficulties in producing and dissemination. The journals and publishing houses may provide resources for these tasks, but the commercialization of academic journals may remain an obstacle for this. This may bring more burden on researchers who do extensive field work; do recording their interviews and who use their analytical thinking when they are in the fieldwork. Translating their interviews from particular languages into English and/or transcribing them, coding them so that anonymity is provided pose important financial and effort on them. Interpretivist scholars may have obstacles reveling how they produce and reveal their research. However, it does not mean that quantitative research-oriented scholars have easy tasks, but researchers with different methodological approaches face various difficulties. Each group may need to develop social norms over time to deal with these difficulties, and the challenge may be a little higher for those scholars who use

both quantitative and qualitative data gathering and analyzing. Therefore, the editors and reviewers, in particular, should take into account these varying perspectives and challenges in making research possible and disseminate.

### *Differences in Context*

Not only data gathering process may differ but also the content of the data. And these data may reveal identifying information about informants even though researchers may do anonymization at their best. The deposition of data into a journal's archive or other archives may disclose some vital information about researchers and the subjects and in many countries. In many non-liberal democracies and authoritarian countries, there is a symbiotic relationship between academia and policy-makers. If they are reviewers and access to the transparency data, they may identify this as well as the informants. Informants may be formally charged or can be blacklisted by the regime. Most spectacularly, there are about one thousand academics blacklisted and being sentenced/purged because they signed an online petition that calls for the end of urban warfare in southeastern Turkey in 2016. Furthermore, there is expectation in many countries is that they have to produce the research outputs in line with the national interest. Not only in Turkey, if editors and reviewers recall what happened in Central European University in Budapest that decided to leave Hungary, but the perils of authoritarian context and problems associated with doing fieldwork and archiving can also be appreciated.

### *Scholars at Different Career Stages*

Those who are concerned about the replication of qualitative works emphasize that long field notes, interviews, participatory observation, and subjective and sometimes sensitive information add extra financial burden over scholars. This may have devastating consequences on those on tenure-track. If they are tenure-track, the risk is higher for them. This will put them into a disadvantageous position relative to those at universities with more resources. The result will be that those with resources have advantages over the have-nots to complete their works, access to more materials and produce more.

### *Type of Institution*

Geographic locations also matter. The research funds and grants vary across developing countries where political and economic stability create significant volatility in their resources. They may be further disadvantaged in terms of publishing, depositing and transparency process compared to their colleagues at North American/European universities. Such trend implies that academia outside of North America/West may give up targeting the major journals in our field and turn to their national academic journals or a particular set of journals that do not accept the DA-RT guideline.

Research or teaching universities have different priorities, which endow academicians with unequal resources. Research funds have diminished, in no small extent, for most academics, while funds for organizing book or article workshops do exist only for a small number of universities. The grant and scholarship opportunities outside of academia exist, but the number and focus do not help to fix the growing disparity in academia. Those with resources have advantages over the have-nots to complete their works, access to more materials and produce more

A number of institutions do not assist junior or senior faculty members; providing no or insufficient/symbolic research funds/conference funds. Resources will vary across teaching and

research universities as well. While this may be the case at least for at some scholars, now they need additional burden on their "have-not" situations. Those who do qualitative works need funds or extra time for encrypting their interviews and field notes. If a journal editor or reviewer wants a full translated and transcribed interviews, they may create an enormous burden on a scholar specialized in a qualitative study.

### *Institutional Review Boards*

IRB is often an integral part of doing research, encouraging scholars to comply with academic ethics. However, not all countries have IRB and even universities do not have the same standards and procedures. IRB institutions in various countries may differ in the definition of protected/vulnerable subjects; IRBs in some states may not allow researching particular topics/subjects (e.g., corruption, genocide, ethnic and religious issues). As pointed out above, some higher institutions of education in the authoritarian context may violate not only the privacy of researchers but also privacy/anonymized informants.

Deception in experimental research poses a threat to the integrity of academic research. However, the deception is not limited to lab/survey experiments but also qualitative oriented scholars may contemplate the deception.

These inconsistencies in IRB process and standards tell us that researchers cannot absolve themselves of thorny ethical aspects of transparency and research explicitness by delegating them to an institutional review board.

## References

- Abbott, Andrew. 1988. *The System of Professions: An Essay on the Division of Expert Labor*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Augereau, Angelique, Shane Greenstein, and Marc Rysman. 2006. "Coordination versus Differentiation in a Standards War: 56k Modems." *Rand Journal of Economics* vol.37 no.4 (Winter 2004): 887-909.
- Barrows, Samuel. 2009. "Racing to the Top ... at Last: The Regulation of Safety in Shipping." In *The Politics of Global Regulation*, edited by Walter Mattli and Ngaire Woods. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009: 189-210.
- Berliner, Daniel, and Aseem Prakash. 2012. "From Norms to Programs: The United Nations Global Compact and Global Governance." *Regulation and Governance* vol.7 (2012 (forthcoming)).
- Bleich, Erik, and Robert J. Pekkanen. 2013. "How to Report Interview Data." In *Interview Research in Political Science*, edited by Layna Mosley. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2013: 84-105.
- Bleich, Erik, and Robert J. Pekkanen. 2015. "Data Access, Research Transparency, and Interviews: The Interview Methods Appendix." *Qualitative & Multi-Method Research* vol.13 no.1 (Spring 2015): 8-13.
- Brookey, Robert Alan. 2007. "The Format Wars: Drawing the Battle Lines for the Next DVD." *Convergence* vol.13 no.2 (May 2007): 199-211.
- Brooks, Sarah M. 2013. "The Ethical Treatment of Human Subjects and the Institutional Review Board Process." In *Interview Research in Political Science*, edited by Layna Mosley. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2013: 45-66.
- Büthe, Tim, and Walter Mattli. 2011. *The New Global Rulers: The Privatization of Regulation in the World Economy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Büthe, Tim. 2010. "Private Regulation in the Global Economy: A (P)Review." *Business and Politics* vol.12 no.3 (October 2010).
- Büthe, Tim. 2012. "Beyond Supply and Demand: A Political-Economic Conceptual Model." In *Governance by Indicators: Global Power through Quantification and Rankings*, edited by Kevin Davis, et al. New York: Oxford University Press, 2012: 29-51.
- Cameron, Maxwell A., Robert J. Lawson, and Brian W. Tomlin, eds. 1998. *To Walk Without Fear: The Global Movement to Ban Landmines*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Cary, William L. 1974. "Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware." *Yale Law Journal* vol.83 (1974): 663-705.
- Cortell, Andrew P., and James W. Davis. 1996. "How Do International Institutions Matter? The Domestic Impact of International Rules and Norms." *International Studies Quarterly* vol.40 no.4 (December 1996): 451-478.
- Crane, Rhonda J. 1979. *The Politics of International Standards: France and the Color TV War*. Norwood, NJ: Ablex Publications.
- Dadush, Sarah. 2010. "Profiting in (RED): The Need for Enhanced Transparency in Cause-Related Marketing." *NYU Journal of International Law and Politics* vol.42 no.4 (2010): 1269-1336.
- DeSombre, Elizabeth. 2005. "Fishing Under Flags of Convenience: Using Market Power to Increase Participation in International Regulation." *Global Environmental Politics* vol.5 no.4 (November 2005).
- Dranove, David, and Neil Gandal. 2003. "The DVD vs. DIVX Standard War: Empirical Evidence of Network Effects and Preannouncement Effects." *Journal of Economics & Management Strategy* vol.12 no.3 (Fall 2003): 363-386.
- Drezner, Daniel W. 2000. "Bottom Feeders." *Foreign Policy* (November-December 2000): 64-70.
- Dryzek, John S., et al. 2019. "The Crisis of Democracy and the Science of Deliberation: Citizens Can Avoid Polarization and Make Sound Decisions." *Science* vol.363 no.6432 (15 March 2019): 1144-1146.

- Elstub, Stephen. 2019. "Deliberative and Participatory Democracy." In *Deliberative and Participatory Democracy*, edited by André Bächtiger, John S. Dryzek and Jane Mansbridge. Oxford – New York: Oxford University Press, 2019: 187-202.
- Finnemore, Martha. 1996. *National Interest in International Society*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Florida, Antonio. 2014. "Beyond Participatory Democracy, Toward Deliberative Democracy: Elements of a Possible Theoretical Genealogy." *Rivista Italiana Di Scienza Politica* vol.44 no.3 (December 2014): 299-326.
- Hamilton, Robert W. 1978. "The Role of Nongovernmental Standards in the Development of Mandatory Federal Standards Affecting Safety or Health." *Texas Law Review* vol.56 no.8 (November 1978): 1329-1484.
- Katzenstein, Peter, Ron Jepperson and Alexander Wendt. 1996. "...". In *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, ed. Peter Katzenstein. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Keck, Margaret, and Kathryn Sikkink. 1998. *Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Kelley, Judith. 2008. "Assessing the Complex Evolution of Norms: The Rise of International Election Monitoring." *International Organization* vol.62 no.2 (Spring 2008): 221-255.
- Knudsen, Jette Steen. 2011. "Company Delistings from the UN Global Compact: Limited Business Demand or Domestic Governance Failure?" *Journal of Business Ethics* vol.103 no.3: 331-349.
- March, James G., and Johan P. Olsen. 1989. *Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics*. New York: Free Press.
- Martinez-Ebers, Valerie, et al. 2016. "Symposium: Local Control and Realities in the Relationship between Institutional Review Boards and Political Science Research " *PS: Political Science and Politics* vol.49 no.2 (April 2016): 287-311.
- McNichol, Tom. 2006. *AC/DC: The Savage Tale of the First Standards War*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
- Murphy, Craig N., and JoAnne Yates. 2011. "ISO 26000, Alternative Standards, and the 'Social Movement of Engineers' Involved with Standard Setting." In *Governing Through Standards: Origins, Drivers and Limitations*, edited by Stefano Ponte, Peter Gibbon and Jakob Vestergaard. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011: 159-183.
- Murphy, Dale D. 2004. *The Structure of Regulatory Competition: Corporations and Public Policies in a Global Economy*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Mutz, Diana C. 2006. *Hearing the Other Side: Deliberative versus Participatory Democracy*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Ponte, Stefano, and Lone Riisgaard. 2011. "Competition, 'Best Practices' and Exclusion in the Market for Social and Environmental Standards." In *Governing Through Standards: Origins, Drivers and Limitations*, edited by Stefano Ponte, Peter Gibbon and Jakob Vestergaard. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011: 236-265.
- Revesz, Richard. 1992. "Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the 'Race to the Bottom' Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation." *New York University Law Review* vol.67: 1210-.
- Risse, Thomas. 2000. "'Let's Argue:' Communicative Action in World Politics." *International Organization* vol.54 no.1 (Winter 2000): 1-39.
- Shapiro, Carl, and Hal R. Varian. 1999. "The Art of Standards Wars." *California Management Review* vol.41 no.2 (Winter 1999): 8-32.
- Snel, Marnix. 2019. "Making the Implicit Quality Standards and Performance Expectations for Traditional Legal Scholarship Explicit." *German Law Journal* vol.20 (2019): 1-20.
- Tamm Hallström, Kristina. 2005. "International Standardization Backstage: Legitimacy and Competition in the Social Responsibility Field." (Paper presented at the SCORE conference, Stockholm, Sweden, October 2005).
- Vogel, David. 1995. *Trading Up: Consumer and Environmental Regulation in a Global Economy*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Vogel, David. 2005. *The Market for Virtue: The Potential and Limits of Corporate Social Responsibility*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.

Warren, Mark E. 1996. "Deliberative Democracy and Authority." *American Political Science Review* vol.90 no.1 (March 1996): 46-60.

Yom, S. (2018). Analytic Transparency, Radical Honesty, and Strategic Incentives. *PS: Political Science & Politics*, 51(2), 416-421.